Henry Dundas and his vision for abolition of slavery
Based on research of the Henry Dundas Committee of Ontario
Where it started — Joseph Knight and Henry Dundas and their legal battle to change the law of slavery in Scotland
It takes an exceptional person to challenge centuries of oppression. Imagine that person being Black, a slave, and a teenager in a Scottish community in the 18th century. That was the situation of Joseph Knight, who years earlier had been taken to Scotland as a slave from Jamaica, and as a young man decided to take on his “owner” and the Scottish establishment and become a free man.
Knight needed more than courage, however. While a lower court ruled that he was a free man, his former owner appealed. He needed an exceptional lawyer, one who would be willing to fight for his rights in Scotland’s highest courts.
That person showed up in 1776 in the form of Henry Dundas, the newly-appointed Lord Advocate for Scotland. Dundas volunteered to take on Knight’s case, and to lead a formidable group of abolitionist-minded lawyers. Together, they convinced Scotland’s highest court to declare in 1778 that Knight was a free man, and that no man could be a slave on Scottish soil.
2. The abolition debate reaches the House of Commons
William Wilberforce, the parliamentary leader of the abolition movement in Britain, quietly started his campaign in late 1780, but quickly gripped the attention of the entire nation. By 1791, he was ready to test the will of the House of Commons, and tabled a motion for the “immediate and complete” abolition of the slave trade. He knew he did not have anything close to a majority, but he sensed that the tide was starting to turn.
Some MPs could not support Wilberforce’ s motion, but spoke in favour of a plan for a gradual process. MP Rowland Burdon, for example, said “he wished to go gradually, and not so much at once, to the question of abolition.”[1] George Sumner was of a similar view, saying “a gradual abolition he would much wish to see.”[2]
It was no surprise when Wilberforce’s first motion suffered a crushing defeat, 163–88. But, the words of moderate MPs provided Wilberforce and his fellow campaigners with glimmers of hope that there was room to grow, and to persuade men of good will to support their cause.[3]
3. A change of strategy
in 1792, the political climate around the abolition issue changed. The tireless campaigning by Wilberforce and others was paying off. Hundreds of thousands of British citizens began to sign petitions in support of abolition.
This time, however, Wilberforce had instructed his supporters to circulate petitions that avoided mentioning “immediate” abolition:
The terms of your petition ought to be such as to allow of a man’s signing it who rather recoils from the idea of immediate abolition.[5]
When he returned to the house in 1792, Wilberforce proposed a motion that was “designed to conciliate his more moderate opponents.”[6] He ensured that the words “immediate” and “complete” were excluded from the motion he presented to the House of Commons on April 2, 1792, although he acknowledged in debate that immediate abolition was still his preferred policy. This time, his motion sought “leave to bring a bill to for the Abolishing of the Slave trade,” without specifying a time for abolition. He reassured the House that the motion did not commit them to a deadline, and the time for abolition would be determined later.[7]
The opposing forces were nonetheless still formidable. The British economy was still dependent on the slave-based economies in the West Indies. Members of Parliament, some of whom would suffer personal financial setbacks from immediate abolition, were subject to heavy lobbying. Between 40 and 50 Members of Parliament were also members of the “Society of West India Planters and Merchants”, a lobby group based in London comprised of direct investors, absentee plantation owners and paid agents who were intent on preserving the slave-based economy in the British colonies.[8] Several peers in the House of Lords were members of the Society. There remained, in effect, a virtual wall of opposition against abolition. Even Edmund Burke, a Tory MP who had previously been an ardent supporter of immediate abolition had lost faith, and abandoned the goal of immediate abolition, believing that opposing forces were too powerful to overcome.[9]
Even though Wilberforce had watered down his motion, the prospects were still bleak. Historian Dale H. Porter, author of a definitive text on Britain’s abolition movement, wrote that the 1792 motion was heading for a “resounding defeat.”[10]
4. The great abolition debate of 1792
On April 2, 1792, Wilberforce introduced his motion for abolition in the House of Commons. Debate lasted through the night and past 6 o’clock the next morning, with William Pitt delivering an impassioned speech as the first light of morning streamed into the House.
Dundas was also one of the last to speak. This was the first time he would speak publicly about the slave trade, as he had been ill and not attending debates around the time of the 1791 motion. In1792, only the MPs with whom he had spoken privately knew that he favoured a policy of gradual abolition, rather than immediate and complete abolition all at once.[11]
By this time, Dundas had risen to become the most powerful politician in Scotland — the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and the right-hand-man of the British Prime Minister. Dundas’s position on abolition was the subject of intense interest. While abolitionists and many of Dundas’s friends were demanding an immediate end to the slave trade, he also had to contend with West Indian interests, who were threatening economic catastrophe and revolution if the government dared to deprive them of the slaves they thought they needed.
Dundas addressed his opening remarks directly to Wilberforce:
I agree with my Honourable Friend as to the material parts of his argument. I am of opinion with him that the trade is not necessary.[12][…]
My opinion has been always against the Slave Trade. I will not, therefore, vote against his motion. I may, however, think it proper to qualify it.[13]
In a radical departure from the approach of Wilberforce and other abolitionists, Dundas proposed an end to hereditary slavery, i.e. an end to the right of slave owners to lay claim to the children borne to their slaves. His vision was that Black children would be educated, and after a period of service to the owners, would be emancipated.
Dundas said he anticipated “the total annihilation of the slavery of these children.”[16]
Dundas argued that there obvious flaws in proceeding to immediate abolition. He said if Britain abolished the slave trade immediately, it would create a void in the trade, and other countries would rush to fill it. He warned that planters would take to smuggling slaves, and British slave traders would find ways to thwart the laws.[14] He said this would be contrary to the humanitarian goals of abolition.
Dundas proposed a compromise — a motion for abolition, but by gradual means.[15] He moved to amend the motion by adding the word “gradually” to the motion.
5. Dundas’s vision
Dundas’s proposal was much more than a plan for gradual abolition of the slave trade.
Professor Porter observed that Dundas’s plan was, in fact, a plan for the eventual abolition of slavery:
He meant regulations to improve living conditions and to educate Negro children, so that eventually a society of educated, able, free and loyal native workers would come into being in the West Indies. Dundas was looking far into the future, and he appealed to all men of moderate views to join him in realizing his vision. […]
In a way no abolitionist had dared to do, Dundas had openly explored the long-range prospects of West Indian society. He accepted emancipation (which Wilberforce feared to mention) as the ultimate goal, and argued that abolition [of the slave trade] was only one is a series of measures which ought to be taken to realize it.[18]
Dundas’s motion to amend was adopted by the Commons: 192 in favour, 125 opposed. The resulting motion for gradual abolition then passed with an overwhelming majority: 230 in favour, 85 opposed.[19] [20]
For the first time in history, abolition of the slave trade became the official policy of the House of Commons, and the Commons had an opportunity to begin to seek the abolition of slavery itself.
6. Dundas presents a 12-point plan for gradual abolition
After the successful vote, Dundas advised the abolitionists to return to the House with legislation for gradual abolition. They refused. They told him gradual abolition was his idea, and he should present a plan. In the meantime, they recommitted themselves to immediate abolition, and girded themselves for a struggle .
Three weeks later, Dundas returned to the Commons with 12 resolutions. Lacking the support of the abolitionists for his larger vision of abolition of slavery and the slave trade, Dundas narrowed his focus to abolition of the slave trade. Dundas prefaced his remarks by reiterating his support for abolition in principle:
… Several years ago, he had formed his opinion upon the propriety and justice of the abolition of the trade, and the report of the evidence before the committee of privy council had confirmed him in that opinion.[21]
Dundas noted his discussions with those on both sides of the debate about the appropriate length of the transition period. He said the abolitionists set their outer limit for complete abolition of the slave trade at 5 years, while the West Indian interests said 10 years was the minimum.[22] Dundas settled on January 1, 1800–7.5 years from that day.
Dundas’s 12 resolutions included measures to abolish part of the slave trade immediately.[23] Within a year, no British person or ship would be able to conduct human trafficking with any foreign territories.[24] This measure alone would immediately eliminate 45% of British involvement in the slave trade.[25]
Other measures would add to this reduction. No British colony would be able to import slaves from the Americas, causing a further diminishment. Ships or companies not already in the trade would be prohibited from entering it, which would cause reduction by attrition. Treaties would be negotiated with other countries involved in the slave trade to prevent them from trafficking with Britain’s West Indian colonies. The measures also would make human trafficking more expensive through additional fees, thereby discouraging the trade.[26] In addition, conditions on ships were to be improved. Children would have to be educated. A particularly controversial resolution was to cut off the trafficking of older Africans, who Dundas said were less susceptible to education, and tended to suffer from higher rates of disease and fatality. The plan proposed upper age limits of 20 for females and 25 for males — although he said this particular measure was not essential.[27]
Dundas’s plan also included two critical legislative initiatives: (a) the government would set up a commission to address compensation to the West Indian interests;[28] and (b) it would introduce legislation to provide for enforcement of the new measures.[29] These measures were intended to discourage West Indian interests and slave traders from doing an end-run around the legislation.
The 12th resolution entailed a plea to His Majesty, King George III, to make overtures to other slave-trading countries to enter into treaties for “the final and complete abolition of the slave trade,” and to encourage the passing of regulations in the West Indies that would improve conditions for slaves.
The MPs who supported immediate abolition bitterly condemned Dundas’s 7.5-year plan. Dundas indicated a willingness to be flexible, and said a shorter deadline for complete abolition could be considered. He warned, however, that it should be as too short a time, since his plan required cooperation of the West Indian legislative assemblies.[30]
7. Abolitionists dismantle Dundas’s plan
On May 1, 1792, the resolutions were again before the house, and the “immediate abolitionists” disregarded Dundas’s warning not to shorten the deadline too much. They heavily amended the plan. They shortened the transition period, setting a new deadline of January 1, 1796. They dispensed with many of the remaining resolutions and removed any reference to compensation. They also removed the proposal for encouragement of international treaties to ban the slave trade.
Dundas objected to this gutting of his plan, with its dramatically shorter timeline. Nonetheless, records of debate show he did not vote against it.[31]
At least one of the leaders of the abolition movement was disappointed in the dismantling of Dundas’s plan. Bishop Beilby Porteus, a member of the House of Lords and a prominent abolitionist, believed that the shorter deadline jeopardized the prospects of Parliament enacting a bill to abolish the slave trade:
This alteration I most sincerely regret, as I fear it will occasion the entire loss of the Question. The term of eight years is a reasonable term and would probably have prevented further opposition. Mr. Dundas himself told me that the West India Planters and Mer-chants would have acquiesced in the annihilation of the trade in 1800. [32] [33]
As a member of the House of Lords, Porteus was privy to the opinions of the peers. If Porteus believed that Dundas’s plan original plan could have survived a vote in the House of Lords, that is good evidence that there were sufficient numbers of moderates among the Lords to make it possible to achieve a successful vote for gradual abolition.
The abolitionists, it turned out, had pushed the House of Lords beyond the limits it would tolerate. The Lords declined to support the amended plan. They decided to hear evidence. After starting hearings on the issue, they adjourned and later dropped the matter altogether, effectively quashing it.[34]
It is apparent, therefore, that it was the gutting of Dundas’s plan that caused the motion to fail. Abolitionists squandered an opportunity to enact an achievable plan that would have reduced the numbers of trafficked slaves by 300,000 between 1793 and 1800.
8. Abolitionists blame Dundas
Wilberforce and other abolitionists later blamed Dundas for intentionally causing the loss of the motion. Their accusations were ill-founded.
If Dundas were genuinely opposed to abolition in 1792, he did not need to add the word “gradual” to Wilberforce’s motion. He did not need to speak at length about the prospect of emancipation, and the existence of a free and educated population of Africans in the West Indies. He did not need to develop a 12-point plan. If Dundas wanted Wilberforce’s motion to fail, all he had to do was sit back and watch it go down to defeat. Regardless of how the House of Commons might vote, the House of Lords was certain to defeat the motion. Instead, Dundas leaned into the issue. He developed a multi-faceted incremental approach that would alleviate the conditions of slaves while reducing the numbers trafficked, and set the groundwork for emancipation.
The abolitionists underestimated the man that Dundas was. An experienced politician, Dundas knew that substantial reforms require the building of coalitions, and a willingness to hear from all stakeholders — a reality that is as true today as it was in the late 18th century. His plan responded to multiple stakeholders, while working towards an achievable goal. Abolitionists, frustrated, suspicious and angry over what they perceived as defeat, missed a critical opportunity. They failed to notice that Dundas had opened a door to an exceptional opportunity to achieve their goals, and to have one of the most powerful members of the government on their side.
9. What would Joseph Knight say?
An important truth stands out in the abolition debate of 1792: Henry Dundas was the first parliamentarian in Britain to speak publicly in favour of the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. Modern historians have ignored this fact, and modern activists seem to be unaware of it.
One cannot help but wonder what Joseph Knight would have said, 14 years after the Court of Session declared him a free man. Would Knight have judged Dundas as harshly as his critics, then and now? Or would he have condemned Wilberforce for waiting decades to pursue the abolition of slavery?
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[1] Ibid., at p. 250. https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/0c28d9e8-cac6-417f-ae69-85270e2273e1
[2] Ibid., at p. 357. https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/6873646b-fbc8-42d1-9055-0661efed6d05
[3]Cobbett, William, editor, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History — volume 29: Comprising the period from the twenty-second of March 1791, to the thirteenth of December 1792, (“Cobbett, Vol 29) “The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-trade, in the House of Commons, April 11, 1791, Reported in Detail,” p 359 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/4667b8fd-88e1-4532-abbc-70945bc99a65
[4] Cobbett, Vol 29, at 275 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/4ce9b46c-cde4-4f72-9539-7d02b7afd45b [Emphasis added.]
[5][5] Wilberforce, Robert I and Samuel, eds., The Life of Wilberforce, I, London, 1838, at p 333, citing a letter to abolitionist Thomas Gisborne.
[6] Porter, ibid.
[7] Cobbett, William, editor, Cobbett’s Parliamentary History — volume 29, at 1073
[8] O’Shaughnessy, Andrew J. “The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution.” The Historical Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, 1997, pp. 71–95, at p. 75, www.jstor.org/stable/3020953.
[9] Benedict Der, Edmund Burke and Africa, 1772–1792, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana , 1970, Vol. 11 (1970), pp 19–20, (“Edmund Burke and Africa”) http://www.jstor.com/stable/41406356
[10] Porter, Dale H., The Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1784–1807, Archon Books, 1970, at p. 80
[11] Cobbett, Vol 29, p. 1104
[12] The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-trade: In the House of Commons,
[13] Ibid., at pp 97–98 [Emphasis added.]
[14] Cobbett, Vol 29 at p. 1106: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/6dbc262d-083a-43ca-9d49-fec09c34825b
[15] The Debate on a Motion for the Abolition of the Slave-trade: In the House of Commons,
[16] Cobbett, Vol 29 at p. 1106: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/6dbc262d-083a-43ca-9d49-fec09c34825b
[17] Cobbett, Vol 29, supra.
[18] Porter, supra, at p. 81 [Emphasis added.]
[19] Debate on April 2, 1792, supra, p. 169. https://books.google.ca/books?id=5xHejAhwH0oC&dq=%22Debate%20on%20a%20Motion%20for%20the%20Abolition%20of%20the%20Slave-trade%22&pg=PA169#v=onepage&q=gradual&f=false
[20] After analyzing the proceedings that day, Porter has calculated that the various factions broke down as follows: 40 abolitionists, 85 anti-abolitionists, and 190 moderates. [Porter, supra, at p. 82]
[21] Cobbett, Vol 29, (supra) at p.1204 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/553bfcda-f828-45c6-8abe-34a19e10011d
[22] Cobbett, Vol 29, (supra) at p. 1208 — https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/46c46085-6f4e-435d-b0aa-d761333be237
[23] Edmund Burke had assisted Dundas in developing some of the resolutions, including making the conditions on ships healthier and more humane. [Edmund Burke and Africa, supra, p. 22]
[24] Cobbett, Vol 29, p. 1213 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/611244c2-8e89-40cf-a708-a1e362c0ccbd
[25] Ibid., At p. 1206: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/f24545f2-f5eb-434f-8320-ab0561e70027 Dundas noted that in 1791, British slavers trafficked 74,000 Africans across the Atlantic, 34,000 of whom were sold to foreign territories.
[26] MacFarlane, Charles, “Narrative of Civil and Military Transactions,” Chapter 1, Pictorial History of England, Being a History of the People, as Well as a History of the Kingdom, Vol III, Charles Knight & Co, London, 1843, at pp 10–11 https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=th48AQAAIAAJ&pg=GBS.PA10
[27] Cobbett, Vol 29, p. 1206–1208 : https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/f24545f2-f5eb-434f-8320-ab0561e70027. See also https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/51ac0037-8501-495e-abdd-715e4cfda55a Dundas noted that the Parliamentary Commission on the slave trade had found that many of the adults who were trafficked were criminals (although he later acknowledged that he had studied this further and the commission evidence may not have been representative of all those who were sold as slaves). He also said that the loss of access to older Africans, which would also reduce trafficking numbers immediately, would induce planters to improve conditions to ensure the health and productivity of the slaves they had. Wilberforce later proposed an upper age limit of 30.
[28] Cobbett, Vol 29, (supra) p. 1208 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/46c46085-6f4e-435d-b0aa-d761333be237
[29] Ibid., at p. 1211
[30] Ibid., at 1292. https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/902d6d4c-a98f-476e-9a2b-f04eb4ab0c0b
[31] Ibid., at p.1293 https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/inquire/p/f774affa-febd-4543-b2b2-0912c976e00a The Committee also relies on private correspondence from the Archives Officer, Parliamentary Archive, Houses of Parliament, London.
[32] Hague, William, William Wilberforce: The Life of the Great Anti-Slave Trade Campaigner, Harcourt, 2007, at p 236, citing a passage from the diary of Bishop Porteous https://archive.org/details/williamwilberfor00hagu.
[33] The “Society of West India Planters and Merchants” referred to here was comprised of absentee plantation owners and merchants in London, some of whom sat in the House of Common: Parley, Christer, White Fury: A Jamaican Slaveholder and the Age of Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2018, at pp 95–96 https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=i1RuDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&dq=White%20Fury%3A%20A%20Jamaican%20Slaveholder%20and%20the%20Age%20of%20Revolution&pg=PA95#v=onepage&q&f=false
[34]Oldfield, J.R., Popular Politics and British Anti-slavery: The Mobilisation of Public Opinion Against the Slave Trade, 1787- 1807 , Routledge, London and New York, 1998 at p. 185 https://books.google.ca/books?id=9PtANRpT--8C&lpg=PP1&dq=Popular%20Politics%20and%20British%20Anti-slavery%3A%20The%20Mobilisatition%20of%20Public&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q=massive%20petition%20campaign&f=false
